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M I C H A E L

T R A T N E R

Working the Crowd:
Movies and Mass Politics
GOING TO THE MOVIES has always been in part an experience of joining a crowd:
picking up the buzz about the latest hit from friends and newspapers, feeling
the line surge forward as the velvet ropes are lifted, getting carried along on a
tide of rolling laughter. Yet ﬁlm critics almost never speak of crowds or crowd
responses when they analyze movies. Film theorists such as Christian Metz,
Kaja Silverman, and Laura Mulvey go so far as to claim that people at Hollywood movies react as if they were utterly alone, each person becoming a spectator isolated in the dark fantasizing about the stars on the screen.1 Though
such theorists often turn to social criticism, they repeatedly describe the audience as if there were only one individual reacting, speaking in the singular of
‘‘the Spectator,’’ ‘‘the Male Gaze,’’ the ‘‘All-Perceiving Subject,’’ and the ‘‘Voyeur,’’ never of crowd responses or mass fantasies or even social trends. Even
critics such as Mary Anne Doane and Manthia Diawara who have sought to
broaden spectator theory by considering that audiences may contain different
kinds of spectators still treat these alternative spectators as individuals reacting
separately to movies.2
Part of the reason critics have ignored the ways that movies elicit crowd
responses is that the dominant theory of crowd psychology—Freud’s—treats
members of a crowd as individuals. In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the
Ego, Freud says that in a mass, each person is lost in a private, unconscious
dream of loving the leader.3 In other words, psychoanalysis converts the crowd
back into a collection of spectators, and so it has become a crucial resource for
ﬁlm theory.
But there are other ways to conceive of the psychology of the crowd, and,
what is most intriguing, Hollywood moviemakers deﬁnitely believed in a nonpsychoanalytic crowd psychology.4 Using the movie industry’s own account of
crowd behavior, we can construct a ‘‘crowd response theory’’ modeled on the
methods by which psychoanalytic spectator theory is constructed. Before examining this alternative psychology, however, it will be useful to brieﬂy
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summarize how spectator theory uses psychoanalysis, to suggest how an alternative psychology might be used to build an alternative ﬁlm theory. Spectator
theory applies psychoanalysis to two elements of the Hollywood experience:
ﬁrst, to the ‘‘cinematic apparatus,’’ the structure of movie projection; and second, to the distinctive style of Hollywood movies. In spectator theory, the apparatus is described as comprising ‘‘the darkness of the auditorium, the
resultant isolation of the individual spectator, the placement of the projector,
source of the image behind the spectator’s head.’’5 This structure makes movie
watching rather like dreaming in bed in the dark. The stylistic features of movies noted by spectator theorists are mostly those which produce the effect that
the movie world is a complete, sealed reality, plus features which deﬁne geometrically and socially a position from which the movie is supposed to be
viewed, what Nick Browne calls the ‘‘spectator-in-the-text.’’6 The viewer thus
seems both completely removed from the ﬁlm world and located in a distinct
position, becoming, as Miriam Hansen puts it, ‘‘the transcendental vanishing
point of speciﬁc spatial, perceptual, social arrangements.’’7 The sense that
there is a transcendental point from which to view everything draws on unconscious feelings from early childhood to fuel ideological effects: the feelings
everyone had for godlike parents are transferred to the dominant group within
society and the viewer is projected as an ideal member of this dominant group
(in the United States, white, middle-class males).
To build a crowd response theory then, we need two more elements besides a non-psychoanalytic psychology: an alternative description of the cinematic apparatus; and an alternative list of ‘‘textual’’ features of movies which
elicit the crowd response rather than turning viewers into isolated spectators.
All these necessary elements, including the psychological theory, can be found
in one document that had tremendous inﬂuence on the way Hollywood movies were constructed, namely, the Motion Picture Production Code of 1930,
dubbed the ‘‘Hays Code’’ after Will H. Hays, the head of the organization that
wrote the code. The Hays Code declares that movies are ‘‘entertainment’’ but
of a very peculiar kind which produces strange effects never encountered before as part of any entertainment, effects which threaten to compromise the
morality of movie viewers so powerfully that moviemakers must censor themselves. The Code begins its account of how these effects are produced by presenting a description of how movies reach audiences, a description of the
cinematic apparatus quite unlike that found in spectator theory:
A) Most arts appeal to the mature. This art appeals at once to every
class—mature, immature, developed, undeveloped, law-abiding,
criminal. Music has its grades for different classes; so has literature
and drama. This art of the motion picture, combining as it does the
two fundamental appeals of looking at a picture and listening to a
story, at once reaches every class of society.
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B) Because of the mobility of a ﬁlm and the ease of picture distribution, and because of the possibility of duplicating positives in large
quantity, this art reaches places unpenetrated by other forms of art.
C) Because of these two facts, it is difﬁcult to produce ﬁlms intended for only certain classes of people. The exhibitor’s theatres are
for the masses, for the cultivated and the rude, mature and immature,
self-restrained and inﬂammatory, young and old, law-respecting and
criminal.8
Instead of focusing on the darkness and supposed isolation of audience
members, as spectator theory does, the Hays Code describes screenings in
terms of the broad distribution of prints and the resultant largeness of the audience. Movies have more ‘‘mobility’’ than any other artform, and as a result
reach quite varied audiences. The Code thus seems to disagree with spectator
theory which says that Hollywood movies are constructed by projecting an audience of persons completely identical to each other (to be more precise, spectator theory says that movies set up a response that lets each person abstract
from his or her position in society into an identically transcendent position).
The two theories, however, are not simply contradictory: Miriam Hansen has
argued that historically, the ‘‘spectator’’ structure developed precisely as a way
to overcome the mixed character of movie audiences, ‘‘to stabilize . . . contradictions’’ and to impose a sense of uniformity of response on moviegoers.9
What the Hays Code shows, however, is that it took much more to deal with
the variation within movie audiences than just structuring each movie to
imply a transcendent and hence identical, white, middle-class male spectator.
The problem with large varied audiences is that within them, people are
no longer individuals, and so cannot assume the role of ideal spectator at all.
The code invokes a theory of crowd psychology to explain this problem, and
it summarizes that theory in one sentence: ‘‘Psychologically, the larger the audience the lower the moral mass resistance to suggestion.’’10 The sentence
seems to invoke commonplace notions of mob psychology and riots, in which
peole gathered together succumb to ‘‘suggestion’’ and lose control of themselves, lose their ‘‘moral resistance.’’ But in conjunction with the description of
the cinematic apparatus—movies shown all over the country to different kinds
of audiences—the invocation of crowd psychology draws attention to a variation on the problem of mobs: it points to what happens when people all over
the country in many different venues are given the same stimulation, the same
suggestion. The concern about certain images or ideas appearing all over a
large society is much older than the Hays Code. One of the best descriptions
of this effect was written by John Stuart Mill in 1859, long before movies, yet
his description ﬁts the way movies operate remarkably well. He wrote his famous essay, ‘‘On Liberty,’’ in order to counter what he calls a ‘‘social tyranny
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more formidable than many kinds of political oppression . . . the tyranny of
the prevailing opinion and feeling . . . to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation of any individuality not in harmony with its
ways.’’11 Mills fears far more than merely people becoming suggestible when
opinions and feelings become prevalent across a large group; he fears the destruction of individuality. Mill goes on to provide an explanation of how ‘‘prevailing opinion and feeling’’ produces this transformation: through the
‘‘magical inﬂuence of custom, which is not only, as the proverb says, a second
nature, but is continually mistaken for the ﬁrst’’ and leads to ‘‘enslaving the
soul itself.’’12 In other words, it is not simply ‘‘ideas’’ commonly held by millions that produce this magical effect, but a set of images of what is ‘‘natural,’’
a ‘‘second nature’’ which is mistaken for the ‘‘ﬁrst.’’ Mill shows that long before
movies came along people worried about false images of the real, about ideological effects. The Hays Code too worries about the ways that movies create
‘‘the apparent reality of life’’ through the vividness of ﬁlm images, bringing stories ‘‘closer’’ to audiences than plays ever could.13
Speaking of the vividness of movie images moves us into the third element necessary to construct crowd response theory: a set of ‘‘textual’’ features
of movies which elicit the responses that are described as occurring in audiences. The realism of Hollywood movies is one of the central tenets of spectator theory, and the Hays Code suggests that realism also functions to produce
crowd responses. The Code goes on, however, to focus on certain elements
overlooked by spectator theory, in particular a list of three which are credited
with special power in moving audiences: ‘‘The grandeur of mass meetings,
large action, spectacular features, etc., affects and arouses more intensely the
emotional side of the audience.’’14 To arouse the emotional side is to draw people away from their rational or moral sides, so what the Hays Code is saying
is that these three elements of movies are particularly effective at lowering the
moral mass resistance of audiences.
The ﬁrst term in the list—the ‘‘grandeur of mass meetings’’—raises the
specter of political gatherings. The phrase would seem to refer to ﬁlms such
as Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, though that ﬁlm came out a few years
after the Hays Code. I do not think it is a mistake to bring up such movies:
the concern about crowds, as I will show later, is in part a concern about the
politics of mass movements, and in particular an effort to protect the United
States against political systems based on representing masses rather than representing individuals, namely Communism and Fascism. Communist and Fascist leaders agreed with the Hays Code that large audiences make people
suggestible, but they presented this as a wonderful effect that promotes morality, not a danger. The ministries of propaganda in Fascist and Communist
countries actively promoted ﬁlms full of scenes of grand mass gatherings.
For now, it is enough to note the oddity of the phrase, ‘‘grandeur of mass
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meetings’’ and to consider why it gets placed as an equal to large action and
spectacular features. The list suggests that mass meetings, large action and
spectacular features share a certain quality, and it is not hard to see what might
be underlying this trio of ﬁlmic features: all of them carry viewers away from
the intimate world of friends and families and into scenes too big to be experienced intimately, scenes that generate the psychological responses of people
as part of a mass.
All three would be presented in movies in long shots, and long shots function for crowd response theory the way that point-of-view shots and shot/reverse shot structures function for spectator theory: point-of-view shots deﬁne
the position spatially and emotionally from which the projected spectator is to
view everything; similarly long shots create what could be called the ‘‘crowdin-the-text’’ by deﬁning the position spatially and emotionally from which the
projected large audience described in the Hays Code is to view everything.
Adapting a term from Louis Althusser, we can say that long shots and in particular crowd shots ‘‘interpellate’’ the large audience directly, creating an image
of the kind of crowd that is observing the movie and implying that the crowd
should have certain qualities and not other qualities.15 Movies ‘‘hail’’ their audiences as crowds in ways parallel to but distinct from the ways they hail audience members as individuals.
One other feature of movies is highlighted in the Code as of particular
power in conveying suggestions to audiences, namely stars:
The enthusiasm for and interest in the ﬁlm actors and actresses, developed beyond anything of the sort in history, makes the audience
largely sympathetic toward the characters they portray and the stories
in which they ﬁgure. Hence they are more ready to confuse the actor
and character, and they are most receptive of the emotions and ideals
portrayed and presented by their favorite stars.16
Stars are not exactly ‘‘textual’’ features of movies; rather, as the Code
notes, they exist partly within and partly outside of movies, and one crucial
part of their power is that they cause audiences ‘‘to confuse the actor and character.’’ Psychoanalytic spectator theory, for all its concern about who is looking
at what, pays little attention to the strange position of stars as only partly contained within Hollywood movies. For one thing, spectator theory postulates
that everything is done by Hollywood movies to make people forget they are
watching a movie—the diegetic world is supposedly experienced as a sealed
reality. Stars break up that sealed reality by bringing into the world of the
movie all kinds of other worlds: the worlds of other roles played by the star;
the world of the star’s real life as an actor; the world of the theater in which
the audience is sitting (because for someone to be a star they must be on a
stage with an audience watching them); and the world of thousands of other
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theaters across the country in which people are also watching this star. The
supposedly sealed diegetic worlds of movies are bent by the presence of stars:
scenes are set up, lit, photographed, and plotted to highlight the star quality
of actors.
Consider, for example, the beginning of Casablanca: before we meet Rick,
nightclub owner in the movie, we watch several people talk about him and
say they want to meet him, and we hear his employees say that he never drinks
with customers. We identify Rick as a Star in the diegetic world of the movie;
then we see him, and it is Humphrey Bogart, a Star playing the role of a Star.
The ﬁrst action Bogart does after we recognize him is to make two decisions
about who gets into the club, so we immediately are reminded of one of the
crucial elements that stimulates the crowd response, the sense that to be in the
crowd is pleasurable and exciting and to be ostracized is painful. Rick lets in
a small-time crook, Ugarte, and keeps out a high-ranking Nazi: the movie thus
suggests that being in the crowd around this star involves moral distinctions
of a sort that we like—we will be allowed the thrill of small, selﬁsh crime and
yet hold to high national moral standards. The scene projects the audience in
the movie theater as part of a certain kind of crowd within the movie and similarly as part of a certain kind of crowd outside the movie, the crowd that
makes Bogart a star by watching many of his movies. This small analysis brings
out what the Hays Code says quite directly, that movie watching is not experienced entirely as a moment of isolation in the darkness; rather, a crucial part
of movie watching is experiencing the sense of being part of a huge group all
across the country watching the same images.
The Code was created as a solution to the problem created by that audience experience, as a solution to the ways movies lower Americans’ moral
mass resistance. The solution proposed is censorship, regulation of the morality represented in movies, particularly sexual and criminal morality. In effect,
the Code is proposing an ingenious way to avoid the consequences of what it
says is inherent in the structure of Hollywood movie production and distribution, namely, that movies tend to reduce people to herd-like followers. If what
people are given to follow is all moral then even if they do not have any moral
resistance to it, it won’t matter. The Code even suggests that by keeping movies moral, they will ‘‘improve the race.’’17 In other words, this Code prescribes
how to make use of the lowered mass moral resistance to suggestion inherent
in the cinematic apparatus, how to make use of the crowd response that makes
people all want to follow opinions expressed simultaneously all over the country, how to construct what Mill called a ‘‘second nature’’ in order to make morality a ‘‘custom.’’
Mill would not approve of this solution to the social tyranny produced by
custom. He advocated restricting the power of prevailing opinion in order to
leave people alone to make up their own minds about things. He pointedly
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rejected the notion of using the power of prevailing opinion to make people
good. The Hays Code does not propose leaving people alone at all, and does
not even propose ways to maintain people’s ability to resist the suggestions
made by movies; it could suggest altering ﬁlm production and distribution,
say, by releasing different movies in different areas of the country, so that there
is no common suggestion being made to people all over the country. Instead
of trying to reduce the crowd response, the Hays Code focuses on how to use
that response. The difference points up a way that individualism has changed
since Mill’s time. Mill’s individualism is a political philosophy based on setting
up legal and political structures that block the social tyranny of the masses;
the Hays Code instead uses the power of social inﬂuence to provide a common
morality for everyone, a morality that favors the individual over the masses.
Private life is no longer separated from public life but is instead constructed
by it.
* * *
Now that we have extracted the elements of a crowd response theory from
the Hays Code, we can turn to using these elements to read Hollywood movies. I start with a ﬁlm that has been given one of the most detailed and brilliant
explications of psychoanalytic/spectator/ideology theory: Young Mr. Lincoln,
analyzed by the editors of Cahiers du Cinéma in 1970.18 Their analysis starts
with a consideration of political issues facing the United States in the 1930s,
turns to Hollywood’s economic involvement with the Republican party, and
then goes on to consider the movie as producing a vision of Lincoln, a Republican, as a transcendent moral ﬁgure, his eyes entirely on The Law even as he
travels through a series of familial and sexual scenes. They emphasize that Lincoln is presented repeatedly with choices he does not make: he remains then
a transcendent spectator who stands beyond the choices other humans have
to make, and indeed beyond politics and sexuality. Producing the movie thus
supports the Republican cause against the New Deal: we need transcendent
Law, not governmental systems. Lincoln goes beyond being simply the greatest
man: while most of the movie establishes that he is, as the authors of the article
put it, capable of ‘‘castrating’’ every other man in the movie, such an act of
standing above other men simply makes him, according to Lacanian theory,
the most anxious about covering up his own ‘‘lack.’’ What makes Lincoln transcendent is that instead of being the biggest male around, he ‘‘is the phallus’’
and so is completely identiﬁed with the Law, transcendent of human dimensions entirely.19
Rather than arguing with this analysis, I want to draw attention to something else produced in this movie along with the sense of Lincoln as the transcendental spectator—and that is a crowd. We don’t have to look very far to
see a ‘‘crowd-in-the-text’’ giving mass responses to various scenes, because the
movie is full of crowd scenes. The movie provides us with careful directions
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to distinguish between good crowds and bad ones, just as movies indicate
which are good spectators and bad ones. Spectator theory has settled on gender as the crucial difference between good and bad spectators in Hollywood
movies, but gender does not distinguish between crowds. Rather, as the Code
suggests, the distinction is between those who have lost their moral resistance
to suggestion and those who have not. In Young Mr. Lincoln, the bad crowd is
a lynch mob out to hang alleged murderers who knifed a man, and the good
crowd is the same group of people seated during a trial as the real murderer
is identiﬁed. In both cases, the crowd is seeking justice, a moral end, but in
the ﬁrst case they go out of control. Lincoln stops them, and one line he says
that seems rather humorous might provide the best explanation of the difference between the two crowds: he says that he is happy to hang murderers, but
he wants it done with some ‘‘legal pomp.’’ The spirit of the crowd—the desire
for moral revenge and the desire to see a hanging—has to be channeled into a
certain kind of performance. The crowd has to become an audience responding to a show produced on a socially structured stage—the courtroom—rather
than the protagonist in a drama enacted on the unstructured streets of the city.
This does not mean the crowd has to learn to be silent and sit in the dark
as spectators while the trial goes on. On the contrary, the trial is entirely presented in terms of the raucous and rowdy responses Lincoln’s tricks and jokes
elicit from the crowd. Lincoln plays the crowd as an entertainer, and in the
climactic scene of the trial, he orchestrates a repetition of the spirit of the
lynching. He does this when he seems to have lost the cause, and as a last
ditch effort, recalls a witness, J. Palmer Cass, to the stand to repeat his testimony that he saw the murder performed in the moonlight. Lincoln seems to
give up, tells Cass to step down, waits until Cass has opened the gate that separates the arena of lawyers, witnesses and judge from the audience, and then
turns on Cass and asks him why he committed the murder. Cass demurs, and
Lincoln takes out an almanac to show that there was no moonlight the night
of the murder, implying that Cass is lying, then asks again why Cass committed the murder. As Cass mumbles a response, the audience rises out of its seats
and surrounds him, repeating the spirit of the lynching. Indeed, the man who
was identiﬁed by Lincoln during the street scene as the big mouth of the lynch
mob, a fellow with the nickname ‘‘Big Buck,’’ takes a central role in this semilegal proceeding by grabbing Cass from behind as Lincoln presses for a confession. Surrounded by an aroused crowd, literally in its clutches, the man confesses, and Lincoln then says, ‘‘your witness,’’ indicating that this moment
which seemed beyond the proper structure of court testimony was just an extended part of that structure. In other words, Lincoln, at the climax of his performance as entertainer/lawyer, orchestrates a crowd response akin to a
lynching, redirecting the fervor that wanted revenge and hanging in the streets
so that it presses a confession out of Cass. The mob is turned into an audience
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controlled by a masterful ‘‘entertainer’’ who even uses the tendency of crowds
to get angry and rise up to get the performance necessary from the villain.
The movie deﬁnes the moment of Lincoln’s almost magical victory as the
moment which elevates Lincoln to the position of Star and so sets him on the
way to being President. As he walks down the hall after the trial, he is told,
‘‘the crowd is waiting’’ and steps into a doorway through which a bright light
shines on him from outside, as we hear people cheering for him, though we
don’t see the crowd. What is enacted on the screen is the structure of the
movie theater itself: a bright light shining over our shoulders as we watch a
Star appear in that light. This return to the crowd in the street joins us to the
mob, but that mob has now become as invisible as we are, projected out just
beyond the screen as the implied ‘‘crowd-in-the-text’’ which watches Lincoln’s
performance as an ideal movie audience.
Actually, the movie also shows that the crowd was performing as a peaceful audience before it became a lynch mob: the lynching came at the end of a
day of festival celebration. The movie thus traces not only the transformation
of lynch mob into audience by Lincoln’s intervention, but the earlier transformation of audience into lynch mob. The cause of such a transformation is just
what the Hays Code suggests: the incursion of improper sexuality and criminality into a scene of exciting entertainment. We could even describe this
transformation as the improper incursion of private life into public spaces, the
bad publicizing of private life. The movie shows this incursion by intercutting
crowd scenes and small interpersonal scenes: the crowd watches Lincoln judge
a pie contest: two hardcases, Scrub White and J. Palmer Cass, tickle a married
woman; the crowd watches Lincoln split a log and start a tug-of-war; the woman’s husband and his brother get angry at the hardcases; Lincoln cheats and
wins the tug-of-war. As we watch, we experience a mixture of public entertainment and private scenes of improper sexual advances.
The alternation of crowd scenes and small interpersonal scenes becomes
much more intense as night falls: the brother talks to his girl about getting
married as he cuts into a log with the knife that will be the murder weapon;
the two brothers take a drink in front of the family campﬁre; crowds surround
a bonﬁre in the dark; there is a ﬁght between the two brothers and Scrub
White, climaxing in Scrub dead and a knife from one of the brothers identiﬁed
as the murder weapon; Cass cries out ‘‘murder,’’ and the crowd around the
bonﬁre, now holding torches, gathers at the murder scene, reacts and heads
off to arrange a lynching. The bonﬁre/ﬁght/lynch mob scenes move so quickly
that it is less than ﬁve minutes from bonﬁre to attempted lynching—and since
the mob carries torches as they leave the murder scene, it feels as if the bonﬁre
has passed through the murder to become a crowd set aﬂame.
The buildup to the lynching scene thus traces the gradual mixing together
of emotions derived from private scenes and emotions derived from crowd
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scenes. The emotions that ﬁre the crowd begin as the emotions which ﬁre the
brothers: anger at immorality interrupting a day of exciting entertainment. Private motives are magniﬁed into public action. The movie also highlights the
central fear of the Hays Code, the danger of mixed audiences. Cass and Scrub
are presented as a different kind of person mixed in with the wholesome
townsfolk: they attend the festival but they refuse to join the crowd projected
as responding to the festival. Instead of watching Lincoln, they watch a married woman. And the result of their being mixed in with the crowd at the festival is that entire crowd ends up transformed, breaking off from following the
pleasant imagery provided by Lincoln and following instead a series of false
suggestions orchestrated by Cass, the very person who refuses to accept the
role as part of the crowd projected for him by the festival. The danger of sexuality and crime in this movie is not that deviant impulses lie deep inside everyone to be revealed when they are alone in the dark (as psychoanalytic theory
would suggest); rather the danger is that sexuality and crime produce dangerous results when they are presented to people who are gathered in large
groups aroused by watching a powerful light projected to produce spectacular
entertainment—the bonﬁre, which becomes an image of movie projection.
The movie is then partly about the need to counter the power of movies
themselves, of false images projected into a crowd by lights and words. The
movie even seems to turn against itself: when Lincoln uses a farmer’s almanac
to show there was no moon at the time of the ﬁght, he raises serious doubts
about what we ourselves saw on the screen, since we saw the ﬁght and it was
undoubtedly lit up, much brighter than the ground around the bonﬁre. What
the almanac shows then, is that what we saw on the screen was not ‘‘reality’’
but a movie version of reality; the lights by which we saw the ﬁght must have
been movie lights, not anything natural at all. The movie itself is exposed as a
liar just as Cass is. The sequence of scenes enacts what the Hayes Code asks
of Hollywood, letting us experience the power of movies to make us accept
quite false suggestions and then reassuring us that Hollywood will use that
power only to support morality.
The movie presents a message about the suggestibility of crowds, and this
message aligns itself with the political concerns about crowds that permeated
the 1930s. While the movie’s invocation of lynch mobs certainly intersects
with distinctively American politics in the South, most of the debate about
crowds in the ’30s was about the pressure toward collectivism worldwide as
the Depression wore on. The main Republican answer to Roosevelt’s radical
policies was the claim that the New Deal was socializing America, was giving
in to collectivism and destroying capitalist individualism. Against such a political backdrop, the movie Young Mr. Lincoln gains most of its political power
from its portrayal of the dangers of out-of-control crowds pursuing mistaken
solutions to local problems. The Lincoln created in this movie could easily be
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used by the Republicans, as the editors of Cahiers du Cinéma argue, to bolster
the image of their party, but he does so by joining them in resisting the appeal
of crowd politics, of collectivism. Lincoln’s admonishment to the lynch mob
applies to the political crowds outside the movie theater reacting to the Depression: ‘‘We seem to lose our heads in times like this. We do things together
that we’d be mighty ashamed to do by ourselves.’’ The emotionally-charged
collective body threatens to destroy the individualist basis of morality.
We can also see the anti-collectivist message of the movie in what the
lynch mob is speciﬁcally trying to do: it would kill two brothers who are small
farmers. The editors of Cahiers du Cinéma note that Republicans attacked the
New Deal’s biggest project, the Tennessee Valley Authority, as a threat to the
American farmer, and conclude that Lincoln’s use of a farmer’s almanac to defend farmers aligns him with such Republican rhetoric. This interpretation can
be carried further if we note that what Republicans said about the TVA is that
it was a step toward socialism, towards collectivized farming a la Stalin. Lincoln would then be closest to Republican rhetoric when he defends farmers
against the aroused mob.
However, we do not have to see the politics of this movie as so completely
Republican as the Cahiers editors would make it: Roosevelt also claimed to be
strongly against collectivism, and promoted the New Deal as an antidote to
socialism, a way to preserve individuals—even small farmers—by using the
collective wealth of the government to provide work so that the unemployed
would not mass together in anger against the entire Capitalism system. The
fear of collectivism was a theme of both parties in the 1930s, and the representation of crowds in this movie mirrors this broad political concern.
It might seem that I am going rather far to identify the passionate crowds
in this movie with images of collectivist movements. To make this equation
more plausible, it might be useful to examine the contrast between what collectivist theorists say about crowds and what defenders of individualism, such
as the Hays Code, say. Communist and Fascist regimes advocate just what the
Hays Code worries about—the alteration of morality caused by emotionally
charged crowds. We can see an early version of these ideas in 1857 in The
Communist Manifesto, where Marx laments what capitalism has done to the
crowd passions of earlier social orders: ‘‘The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got
the upper hand . . . has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water
of egotistical calculation.’’20
Marx wishes to restore the ‘‘ecstasies’’ and ‘‘enthusiasm’’ that were felt before capitalism came along. He even sees the most virulent expression of such
emotions—riots—as a crucial motivating force that will bring about the workers’ revolution:
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with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases
in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength
grows, and it feels that strength more . . . the workers begin to form
combinations (Trades’ Unions) against the bourgeois . . . here and
there the contest breaks out into riots.
Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The
real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the
ever-expanding union of the workers.21

Marx describes riots as bearing ‘‘fruit’’ in the growing feeling of strength and
unity among workers. Riots are frequently invoked in accounts of crowd psychology, but Hollywood ﬁlmmakers and Marx intrepret the ‘‘fruit’’ of riots quiet
differently. To Hollywood ﬁlmmakers riots show the loss of moral resistance to
suggestion; to Marx, they show the growth of a new proletariat morality.
Hitler is even more direct in Mein Kampf about the value of the riotous
emotions which a crowd is believed to generate. He says that when a person
enters a
mass demonstration . . . he is swept away by three or four thousand
others into the mighty effect of suggestive intoxication and enthusiasm, . . . then he himself has succumbed to the magic inﬂuence of
what we designate as ‘mass suggestion.’ The will, the longing, and
also the power of thousands are accumulated in every individual. The
man who enters such a meeting doubting and wavering leaves it inwardly reinforced: he has become a link in the community.22
Note the similarity of the conceptions which are invoked by the Hays
Code, by Marx and by Hitler as they all talk about the crowd experience: ‘‘enthusiasm,’’ ‘‘ecstasy,’’ ‘‘intoxication’’ and intensely ‘‘aroused . . . emotions.’’
What Hitler praises—the magic inﬂuence of mass suggestion—is identical to
what the Hays Code presents as a dangerous effect of movies, the ‘‘lower . . .
moral mass resistance to suggestion.’’
Part of what worried the writers of the Hays Code was the similarity between what movies seemed to do to people and what mass demonstrations
and riots seemed to do. That similarity was noted by numerous writers in the
early twentieth century; as the ﬁlm historian Jane Gaines comments ‘‘one can’t
help noticing the way motion pictures have been closely aligned with and even
analogized with riots, particularly during the early decades of cinema.’’23 The
relationship between movies and riots slid easily into a fear that movies could
have political consequences unintended by moviemakers. In 1919, for example, guidelines of the Committee on Public Information, reprinted in the New
York Times, cautioned against pictures containing ‘‘mob scenes and riots which
might be entirely innocent in themselves but [could be] distorted and used
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adversely to the interests of the U.S.’’24 The fear in this sentence is not only
that the United States might appear badly if the world knew about riots in the
country; a deeper fear is that the spirit of riots is inherently antithetical to U.S.
ideology. The American Committee of the Motion Picture Industry of the
United States, responding to such concerns, was formed in the twenties to
combat ‘‘Bolshevism, radicalism and revolutionary sentiment,’’25 but it could
not stop repeated attacks on Hollywood movies for containing Communist
sentiment, culminating in the HUAC hearings after World War II. The constant fear of Communism in Hollywood movie history derives in part from
the belief expressed in the Hays Code that movies produce powerful collective
emotions which overwhelm individual thought and morality.
The overt concern of Hollywood ﬁlmmakers about collectivist effects of
their movies has been overlooked by ﬁlm critics and theorists. I suggest that
much of the reason for this oversight is that ﬁlm critics and theorists have ignored the roles of crowds, treating Hollywood movies as entirely stories about
a few individuals. For example, Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson’s inﬂuential
book, The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and Mode of Production to
1960, summarizes Hollywood narrative structure and its politics in these two
sentences: ‘‘Character-centered—i.e. personal or psychological—causality is
the armature of the classical story. . . . It is easy to see in the goal-oriented
protagonist a reﬂection of an ideology of American individualism and enterprise.’’26 The problem I am exploring arises precisely when we try to make that
seemingly easy leap from watching a story or a series of stories about individuals to the generalization that these stories reﬂect an ‘‘ideology of individualism.’’ Individualism is not as easy to see as it seems, not in Hollywood movies,
not in social history and not in political theory. Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson are simply wrong in saying that character-driven plots are enough to make
movies into supports for individualism. Wouldn’t stories about the power of
individuals to shape their own lives be more congenial to arguments for anarchy (no governing structure) than they are to arguments for individualism
(i.e., the need for a state with strong institutions to protect the rights of individuals)? Perhaps it would be most accurate to say that movies entirely about
individuals and small group interactions have almost no political consequences, since such small group interactions are obviously part of all social
systems. Communists, Nazis, Liberals, Racists and Anarchists all advocate social systems in which most people fall in love and negotiate their friendships
without government interference.
Something else needs to be in a movie besides a goal-oriented protagonist
and his few friends and lovers to make it seem that a story supports individualism. To defend individualism is to show a contrast between a social order
based on individuals and one based on something else, and that something
else has to be described or shown. In other words, to argue for individualism,
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one has to present an invasive, non-individualist entity—a tyrannical social
group such as a crowd, or perhaps a person identiﬁed as the spokesperson for
such a group. Negative images of crowds have been part of the very concept
of individualism since its ﬁrst appearance in the English language, in 1835,
when Alexis de Tocqueville deﬁned the term as ‘‘a feeling, which disposes each
member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellowcreatures, and to draw apart with his family and friends.’’27
In the early twentieth century, as genuine collectivist movements
emerged, individualism shifted from a genial desire to draw apart from the
mass to an active terror of it. Walter Lippmann, one of the most inﬂuential
political commentators and a strong defender of individualism in the 1920s,
writes that even trying to think about society as a collective whole will result
in unleashing wildly dangerous emotions: ‘‘to aim at justice among the interests of individuals is to keep opinion wholesome by keeping it close to intelligible issues: to aim at a purposeful collectivism is to go off into the empty air
and encourage a collective madness in which, for want of rational criteria, the
darkest and most primitive lusts are churned up’’28
Like Lippmann, Hollywood wants to keep opinion wholesome, but the
problem it faces is that its medium seems aligned with the collective madness
threatening wholesomeness. Lippmann’s words hint at one of the ways Hollywood has sought to sove this problem: by characterizing the difference between
individualism and collectivism as the difference between wholesomeness and
lust, Lippmann seems to slip from the language of politics into the language
of sexuality. The Hays Code makes a similar move, starting off speaking of the
dangers of collective emotions and then shifting to speaking about sexuality
and criminality. The shift from sociopolitical to sexual language in the Hays
Code and in Walter Lippmann’s account is not simply a way of ignoring the
political issues which hover around the notion of collective passions. Rather, it
is an important method developed in the twentieth century by non-collectivist
nations such as the United States to redirect the powerful emotions generated
by crowds. In response to the claims of collectivist writers such as Marx and
Hitler that mass meetings, crowd experiences and even riots generate important political emotions, individualists argue that the intense emotions which
emerge in crowds are all sexual in nature. If that is so, then crowd scenes can
be used as powerful stimulants in movies, so long as the emotions churned up
are redirected into the bedroom.
Freud is of course the main source for the belief that crowd emotions are
sexual, and if we look back at his treatises, we can see evidence that he too
sought political ends through this theory. In 1920, in Group Psychology and the
Analysis of Ego, he argued that sexuality could be an antidote to mass political
fervor: ‘‘directly sexual impulsions . . . disintegrate every group formation . . .
love for women breaks through the group ties of race, of national divisions,
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and of the social class system, and it thus produces important effects as a factor
in civilization.’’29 He also claimed that this effect depends on the historically
modern form of love, not just on sexuality: ‘‘the opposition between sexual
love and group ties is . . . a late development’’; earlier forms of sexuality (in
which he explicitly includes homosexuality) are compatible with the herd.30
So leading people to supposedly higher forms of sexuality, as psychoanalysis
claims to do, is a way to resist group ties and thus to resist the attraction of
the group politics of race, class, and nationalism. As Freud put it, two people
declaring they are in love ‘‘are making a demonstration against the herd instinct, the group feeling.’’31
Freud implies that love stories can be used to counter collectivism, and
Hollywood movies have in fact repeatedly done just that. If we consider the
most popular love stories as calculated by constant dollars—Gone with the
Wind, The Sound of Music, Dr. Zhivago, and Titanic—we see that they all set
their central passions against backdrops of huge crowds pursuing political
ends.32 Three of these movies—Dr. Zhivago, The Sound of Music, and Titanic,
set their love stories against the backdrop of those collectivist movements
upon which I have been focusing, Communism and Fascism (taking Titanic as
a movie about class war, set just before the Russian Revolution; James Cameron, the director, even described the movie as ‘‘holding just short of Marxist
dogma’’).33 The one that does not focus on modern collectivism—Gone with
the Wind—focuses on the largest mass division ever to appear within the
United States, the split of the North and South over racial issues. We could
add in as another example of this mixture of collective social events and private love affairs the movie which Ray Merlock called the most ‘‘popular ﬁlm of
the century,’’ Casablanca. This list shows that it is almost a formula for movie
popularity to set a love story against scenes of masses collectively pursuing
political ends.
Of course there are powerful, deep characters, intense sexual passion, and
all sorts of psychoanalytic issues at the center of each of these movies; nonetheless, much of their popularity and emotional impact is due to scenes in
which the main characters are reduced to dots or small silhouettes, scenes full
of masses of people or vast landscapes that mock the importance of private
life: the burning of Atlanta and Tara at sunset; a huge ship and hundreds of
bodies in the water; the mountain meadows and Nazis marching; the Russian
Revolution and snow-covered steppes; the Nazi invasion of France. The audience feels both sexuality and the awfulness of vast powers that can move
huge numbers of persons about regardless of the individual feelings of those
persons.
It might seem that the vast social upheavals in these movies simply add
piquancy by interrupting the love stories, making the love seem all the greater
for emerging in such turbulent times. But if we examine these movies carefully,
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we see that the turbulence parallels, supports and often directly causes the
love affairs. The violent social upheavals do not stand in the way of sexual
passions; they release those passions. Scarlett needs the Civil War to kill her
husbands and force her into Rhett’s arms. Ilsa needs the Nazi invasion to separate her from her husband and allow her to meet Rick thinking Lazlo is dead.
Zhivago and Lara need the Russian Revolution to remove them from their marriages and thrust them into each other’s arms.
The connections between social events and love affairs are not just plot
devices: the emotions underlying the vast social disruptions—the political desires motivating huge mass movements—are presented as nearly identical to
the emotions, the desires, leading to the love affairs. In Titanic, the desire to
escape class oppression which structures the crowd scenes is directly paralleled to the emotions Rose develops upon meeting Jack: she breaks through
oppressive class boundaries by leaping into Jack’s arms, carrying out the desire
that fuels the anger of all those people trapped below ship. The movie ends on
the line that he ‘‘freed her in every way’’: their love somehow embodies the
desire for class liberation which is everywhere in the movie as a political
theme. Similarly, in Dr. Zhivago, the desire to escape class oppression and unfair authority that motivates the revolution also seems to underlie Lara’s move
into Zhivago’s arms. Before the revolution, Lara is impoverished and as a result
manipulated and used by a wicked rich man, Komarovsky. She is quite directly rescued by the revolution, marrying the leader of the workers, Pasha.
But then Pasha abandons her to become Strelnikov, a ﬁgure modeled on Stalin.
When she ﬁnally ﬁnds Zhivago and a satisfying love, she is thus rescued from
both her initial class oppression and the authoritarianness of the misguided
revolution. Love is a better solution to social oppression than revolution. Or
at least it is for a while: the ﬁnal sadness of the movie is that Komarovsky gets
her back, a plot twist that in effect converts love back into desire for revolution: to allow the love that seemed so wonderful in this movie, we still need to
get rid of the manipulative capitalists, the Komarovskys, hopefully with better
leaders than Pasha/Strelnikov. Gone with the Wind focuses on an earlier shift in
mass social formations than the one presented in these other movies, tracing
the emergence of capitalism itself out of aristocracy: coarse, entrepreneurial
Northern carpetbaggers destroy the graceful charm of the Old South. Once
again, the emotional course of the love affair requires this social transformation: most of the narrative of the love story is taken up with Scarlett’s learning
to give up her dream of the Old South, embodied in Ashley, and love instead
the manipulative, entrepreneurial Rhett. As Louis Rubin, Jr., puts it, ‘‘the debacle of war and the breakdown of the old plantation society serve to liberate
Scarlett.’’34 The movie ends rather as Zhivago does, with love disappearing and
in a sense being converted back into a desire for social upheaval, for something like another Northern invasion: Rhett leaves Scarlett, saying that he goes
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off to recover the charm of the Old South, and we are left hoping somewhat
ambivalently for the destruction of whatever remains of the Old South, so that
Rhett will recognize that he prefers the new social order and return to loving
the manipulative, entrepreneurial Scarlett.
Psychoanalytic theory would say that the parallels of sexual and political
stories in these movies shows that sex underlies everything, that the politics in
these movies is all misplaced sexuality. I propose that these movies show exactly the opposite, that the most powerful and romantic sexual desires can
emerge out of—may even need to emerge out of—radical political desires such
as the desire for freedom from class restrictions and the desire to destroy the
whole social order.
To demonstate that sexual emotions are represented in these movies as
transformed versions of prior political or crowd emotions, I want to focus on
a particular kind of moment which appears in each of these movies: a moment
when a vast crowd scene substitutes for and becomes the representation of
sexual passion, so that we in the audience are looking at and reacting to a long
shot of political signiﬁcance just when we were expecting to react sexually. For
example, in Casablanca, Ilsa, having just learned that her husband is alive,
leans toward Rick as he asks her about her past and says, ‘‘There is only one
answer to all our questions,’’ and in a sudden cut the frame erupts into smoke,
tanks, soldiers, planes—a monumental crowd scene that, as an explosive disaster, mirrors the explosive sexuality between the two of them. And then a bit
later, as the two embrace, we hear a mufﬂed explosion and Ilsa asks, ‘‘Is that
cannon ﬁre or my heart pounding?’’ War and sexuality cannot be told apart.
Dr. Zhivago, Titanic and Gone with the Wind contain similar moments
when sexuality occurs off stage while we see directly violent crowd scenes or
long shots which strangely resonate as images of the unrepresented sexual passion. In Dr. Zhivago, when Lara loses her virginity to Komarovsky, the scene is
played out as a complete parallel to the passions inciting the revolution: Komarovsky leans over, kisses Lara agressively, and the camera pulls back from
their cart to linger on a military ﬁgure who turns to his men to command them
‘‘mount.’’ We cut then to a man’s crotch landing on a horse, then pull back to
see many men mounting their horses. The scene proceeds as these soldiers
walk their horses into the streets to confront the revolutionary workers marching. Then the captain commands the men to draw their sabers, and we watch
the soldiers slash up marching workers, in a chaotic scene that ends with the
camera moving in on Zhivago looking down at a patch of blood on the snow
then cuts suddenly to Lara pulling her clothes back together. Komarovsky’s
seducing Lara’s virginity is thus replaced by soldiers massacring revolutionary
workers. The parallel continues as Lara’s ﬁancé, leader of the march, gives her
a gun to hide, saying that from then on the revolution will no longer be peaceful (the workers have lost their innocence by shedding their blood on the
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snow). But the gun transfers its revolutionary violence to Lara, who ends up
using it to shoot Komarovsky. Sexual and political passions are somehow interchangeable, and all concern about the condition of the poor suffering people of Russia is transferred to our concern about who is going to take care of
Lara. Zhivago’s great romance with her involves his violating his proper upperclass marriage, so in effect he enacts the Russian Revolution in his private life.
In Titanic and Gone with the Wind, sexuality peaks offstage while we watch
images which are paralleled to scenes of mass destruction. In Titanic, the sexual climax occurs behind a steamed auto window, and is represented by a
rather ghostly white hand that slides up out of the cloudy part of the window
and then tracks down back into it. We know that the hand is only a metonymic image of the powerful movements of sexuality occurring just below
that wet surface. Soon after that scene, we see the iceberg rising out of the
water, but this time the camera descends to actually show the explosive contact below the watery surface. In Gone with the Wind, the ﬁery sexual coupling
of Rhett and Scarlett takes place in the dark after Rhett carries Scarlett upstairs,
but in another scene we see Rhett carry Scarlett at night in front of a wall of
ﬁre as they escape Atlanta. Both scenes are structured to place the two lovers
against a backdrop of a red triangle cut by horizontal lines: the burning buildings and the stairs alike are the locus of ﬁery explosive feelings. I suggest that
we feel the heat of their relationship in that ﬁre. The war is sexual; sexuality is
warlike.
In all these movies, the explosive climaxes of the public stories—the destruction of the ship, the burning of Atlanta, the Nazi invasion, the Russian
Revolution—become metaphoric representations of sexuality bursting forth.
Part of the reason for these substitutions for sexuality is, of course, the Hays
Code, which dictated that sexuality must be left off the screen. But censorship
led to a discovery that Hollywood has clearly followed even after the Hays
Code disappeared: the national and international reaction to love stories is
greater if scenes of crowd passions provide the visual substitute for sexuality.
Movie sexuality has its greatest effect on the masses if it carries with it the emotions generated from vast social upheavals.
In the G-rated family movie, The Sound of Music, instead of explosions
substituting for sexual climaxes, we have musical numbers substituting for
both explosions (which are reduced to thunder behind the song ‘‘My Favorite
Things’’) and sexual climaxes. This movie, like all the others, traces a liberation
from rigid, inhibiting, institutions (The Convent, The Military) to a sexual relationship, but in this case what identiﬁes liberation is the eruption of music.
The inhibiting institutions destroy music either through enforced silence or a
shrill commanding whistle; liberation, both sexual and political, is identiﬁed
by happy singing. The climax of this movie is a giant crowd scene in which
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the triumph of love and of anti-Nazi politics is represented by showing an audience undergoing the same transformation, overcoming their fear of authority
to sing ‘‘Edelweiss’’ while surrounded by Nazi ofﬁcers, after which the central
couple disappears as they achieve their musical peak (winning the folk contest) and their political peak, escaping Nazi authority to the mountains.
What unites all these most popular love stories is that sexuality peaks in
the dissolution of the individual, replaced by a moving crowd—exploding,
marching or singing. Sexuality in these movies is not represented as a private
something but rather is conveyed to the audience as an experience of merging
with others, losing bodily boundaries, losing control, feeling a ‘‘movement’’ so
powerful that it seems to carry with it huge crowds of people. And this should
not be surprising, since the theater audience itself has to be ‘‘moved’’ all together as a crowd for the movie to work. Sexuality is experienced by the audience and represented within these most popular Hollywood movies as the
feelings underlying mass movements.
I am not simply punning on the word ‘‘movement’’: these movies create
sexuality by drawing on the political feelings that underlie actual mass movements, the political anger about social crises affecting millions. Hollywood
relies on the emotions that threaten to fuel mass rejection of capitalism—
anger at class or gender or racial inequities—but turns those emotions into
mass support for American individualism by showing that they would be dangerously misdirected if they become the motives for crowd action. Instead
movies construct private plots which parallel the plots underlying public issues and hence can borrow the passions generated by those issues. Private life
in twentieth-century America is no longer a place to escape mass emotions; it
has become instead a receptacle into which the intensity of mass emotions can
be poured without danger of riot or revolution.
Bryn Mawr College
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